Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood Simon Evnine

ISBN: 9781281852885

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ebook

176 pages


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Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood  by  Simon Evnine

Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood by Simon Evnine
| ebook | PDF, EPUB, FB2, DjVu, AUDIO, mp3, ZIP | 176 pages | ISBN: 9781281852885 | 4.46 Mb

Simon Evnine examines various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second-order beliefs about their own and others beliefs, and are agents, capable of making long-termMoreSimon Evnine examines various epistemic aspects of what it is to be a person. Persons are defined as finite beings that have beliefs, including second-order beliefs about their own and others beliefs, and are agents, capable of making long-term plans.

It is argued that for any being meeting these conditions, a number of epistemic consequences obtain. First, all such beings must have certain logical concepts and be able to use them in certain ways. Secondly, there are at least two principles governing belief that it is rational for persons to satisfy and are such that nothing can be a person at all unless it satisfies them to a large extent. These principles are that one believe the conjunction of ones beliefs and that one treat ones future beliefs as, by and large, better than ones current beliefs.

Thirdly, persons both occupy epistemic points of view on the world and show up within those views. This makes it impossible for them to be completely objective about their own beliefs. Ideals of rationality that require such objectivity, while not necessarily wrong, are intrinsically problematic for persons.This aspectual dualism is characteristic of treatments of persons in the Kantian tradition. In sum, these epistemic consequences support a traditional view of the nature of persons, one in opposition to much recent theorizing.



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